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After Kremlin policymakers decided to incorporate the territory of Crimea into Russia, 
updates on public attitudes in Russian-speaking communities elsewhere in Ukraine would 
have been in high demand. Because social media users produce content in order to 
communicate ideas to their social networks, online political discourse can provide 
important clues about the political dispositions of communities.  We map the evolution of 
Russian-speakers’ attitudes, expressed on social media, across the course of the conflict 
as Russian analysts might have observed them at the time.  Results suggests that the 
Russian-Ukrainian interstate border only moved as far as their military could have 
advanced while incurring no occupation costs – Crimea, and no further. 
 
 
Revise and Resubmit, Post-Soviet Affairs  
 
Epigraph: 
 
“I would like to remind you that what was called Novorossiya, back in the tsarist days, 
Kharkiv, Luhans’k, Donets’k, Kherson, [M/N]ikolayev, and Odes[s]a were not part of 
Ukraine back then. The territories were given to Ukraine in the 1920s by the Soviet 
government. … Why? God only knows!...”  
 -- Vladimir Putin, April 2014	
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1. Introduction: Some Facts 
On November 21, 2013, protests in Kyiv started against President Victor Yanukovych.  
On the night of February 21, 2014, Yanukovych fled Ukraine.  On or around February 27, 2014, 
Russian special forces entered Crimea. Russia’s interstate borders seemed to be expanding, and 
Ukraine’s contracting, under a “regime phase” of territorial realignment (Lustick 1993, 123).  
With the map already re-drawn, and no Ukrainian authority to make arrests, newly-formed pro- 
and anti-government militias acted on their own accord. Throughout 2014 these militias clashed 
with each other and brutalized civilians.  Few of the anti-government militias had much success 
seizing or holding government buildings or other symbols of power.  The exception to this 
general rule was the eastern Donbas region of Ukraine, where indigenous insurgents captured the 
regional apparatus of the state in two regions (oblasts), Donets’k and Luhans’k.   
Militias clashed, then consolidated, and, eventually, formed stable coalitions with 
hierarchical chains of command.  Those coalitions are today referred to as “the Ukrainian army” 
and “the secessionist rebels” in both academic and policy shorthand.  In the first year of fighting 
approximately 4,000 civilians were killed.  More than one million individuals fled their homes as 
refugees or IDPs.  Property and industry damage is estimated in the tens of billions of dollars.  
Zones of fighting calcified into stable frontlines in the winter of 2015 after Russia sent regular 
troops to tip the scales at two critical junctures, the Battles of Ilovaisk and Debaltseve.  Territory 
has not changed hands significantly since those battles.  As the war conventionalized along a 
territorially-fixed line of contact, the brutalization of civilians slowed (see Figure 1). 
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Figure	1	
	
CAPTION:	 Cumulative	 civilian	 and	military	 deaths	 in	Ukraine	 between	 February	 2014	 and	 September	 2016.	 	 The	
darker	 column	 is	 civilian	deaths	and	 the	 lighter	 column	 is	 the	 sum	of	 civilian	and	military	deaths.	Data	 from	the	
United	Nations	Office	of	the	High	Commission	for	Human	Rights	(OHCHR).		
	 	
“parties subject to a common authority at the 
outset of hostilities” violently contest control 
of the state, or of a territory within it. 
Source: United Nations Office of the High Commission for Human Rights (OHCHR) 
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Figure	2	
 
CAPTION:	Military	deaths	as	a	 fraction	of	 total	oblast	population	on	 the	Ukrainian	side	since	 the	spring	of	2014.		
Data	on	the	birthplace	of	the	deceased	is	from	Ukrainian	Memorial.		Data	on	Oblast	populations	is	from	the	2001	
Ukrainian	 census.	 	 A	 thick	 line	 surrounds	 the	 territory	 of	 historical	 Novorossiya,	 which	 in	 defiance	 of	 early	
predictions	 is	producing	anti-invasion/anti-Putin	martyrs	at	a	 rate	 that	consummate	with	other	parts	of	Ukraine.		
The	 largest	 dot	 represents	 the	 city	 of	 Dnipro.	 Crimea	 is	 shown	 on	 this	map	 and	 others	 in	 this	 paper	 as	 part	 of	
Ukraine	in	order	to	reflect	the	plasticity	of	interstate	borders	that	would	have	been	felt	at	the	time. 
  
STATA and GIS. After running a gladder command in STATA and scatterplot in GIS, it 
became obvious that data needs to be normalized. To normalize the data all observations 
and distance were squared.  
8. Moran’s statistics was performed on the residuals to see if they are auto correlated. 
9. GWR was performed on squared and non-squared observations. Then the fields was 
added to GWR attribute table (for the non-squared observations GWR) to calculate t-
statistics. With the help of field calculator we divided coefficient by standard error. Then 
we chose by attribute only significant (where t-statistic > 1.96) coefficients and created a 
layer from selected. Then we were able to map the significant coefficients only.  
 
 
Maps and findings: 
 
Map 1: Shows  
This map shows the battle deaths as a proportion of population and in red there is a 
boundary of Novorossiya. The battl  deaths seem to be andomly scattered but it is difficult to 
say without running an OLS. However, simple regression will give us a biased estimate as the 
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We are now five years in.  What has emerged is not the ethnic bloodbath some experts 
feared.  There has been no Srebrenica.  Ethnic identities have hardened, perhaps, but not in 
simple ways pitting ethicized Russians against ethicized Ukrainians.  Civilizational and religious 
fault lines have not been weaponized as some pessimists predicted.  Most Russian-speakers 
living in Ukraine in 2014 rejected calls for rebellion against the post-Yanukovych government.   
Many born in historical Novorossiya went further, actively performing their Ukrainian 
patriotism by volunteering to fight off an invasion.  Consider Figure 2.  It is a map of Ukrainian 
martyrs per capita by oblast.  Each dot represents the fraction of an oblast’s population that have 
died on the frontlines, usually victims of shells fired from the territory of the self-declared 
‘Donets’k people’s republic’ (DNR) or ‘Luhans’k people’s republic’ (LNR).  It has been well-
documented that many pro- and anti-Putin fighters on both sides have pilgrimaged from distant 
lands, but it is also well-documented that many fighters are locally recruited.  Russian is the 
lingua franca on both sides of the line of contact.  Many soldiers imagine themselves to be 
fighting for their homes.  Ukraine’s war pits Russian-speakers that accept the premises of the 
Russian state narrative against Russian-speakers that are inoculated against that narrative.   
This paper uses social media data to reconstruct how the Russian-state narrative was 
received by Russian speakers living in Ukraine during the critical period between February 2014 
(when Yanukovych fled Kyiv) and the Battle of Ilovaisk (when the Russian military intervened 
directly and froze the territorial front-lines).  Our conjecture is that during that time, policy elites 
in Moscow would have been considering using their conventional military to move the 
undeclared front-lines of the war further West.  These planners would have been hungry for 
information on the social attitudes of Ukrainian Russian-speakers (russkoiazychnoe naselenie).  
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Russian planners would have wanted to know if they were interested in opting out of the 
Ukrainian polity.  
We show that Russian-language social media traffic could have been one new source of 
military intelligence.  Since the prevalence of overtly political behaviors on social media 
provides important clues about the political dispositions within communities, a growing body of 
scholarship has taken advantage of these data to understand contentious action in Ukraine 
(Onuch 2015, Metzger et al. 2015, Wilson 2017, Metzger and Tucker 2017).  Our departure from 
previous studies is emphasizing the potential for these data to be repurposed for crisis decision-
making. As proof of concept, we reconstruct a number of different maps of social attitudes 
shared by users of Russian-speakers active on social media.  Our dataset contains approximately 
7 million online user entries (tweets), all generated within the territorial borders of Ukraine.  
Aggregated patters in the data we analyze provide a measure – noisy, but informative – of how 
many self-identified Russians living in Ukraine would have favored border revision.  Most did 
not.   
Our supposition is that if Russian strategists were considering expansion beyond Crimea, 
they would have been able to use social media information to assess, with a great deal of 
precision and in real time, the reception that they would likely receive. Since interstate border 
changes are rare events, the re-purposing of public data for military reconnaissance has not yet 
been considered despite excellent studies of how polarized media bubbles allow conflicting 
coverage of the same events (Warren 2014, Baum and Zhukov 2015, Peisakhin and Rozenas 
2018), how internet connectivity enables cyber-operations (Gartzke 2013, Kostyuk and Zhukov 
2017), and the advantages that some states seek by deliberately muddying the historical record 
(Beissinger 2015, Laurelle 2015, Hopf 2016, Snyder 2018, Hale et al 2018). 
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2. Background: Divergent Narratives 
Violence between self-identified Russians living in Eastern Ukraine and their self-
identified Ukrainian neighbors was not an issue after the disintegration of the Soviet Union.  In a 
study comparing the characteristics of four Russian-speaking “beached diasporas” – 
communities that found themselves living on parts of what they construed as their homeland, but 
divided among new post-Soviet states – Laitin (1998) attributes peaceful interethnic relations in 
Ukraine to a combination of deterrence and the ambiguity of political identity boundaries: 
The major mechanism holding back interethnic violence in Ukraine … is the feeling by 
Russians … that if they were ever terrorized (qua Russians) by the [Ukrainians], the 
Russian Federation would come to their aid.  […]  But another mechanism reducing the 
likelihood of interethnic violence … is the embarrassing fact (for both sides) that the 
boundaries of opposition are not at all clear.1 
 
The breakdown of this peaceful equilibrium began in the fall of 2013.  On November 21, 2013, 
Ukrainian President Viktor Yanukovych declined to sign an association agreement with the 
European Union (EU) in order to explore membership in Russia's Eurasian Economic Union 
(EEU).  This reversal was seen as the culmination of years of friction and competition between 
Russia and Western Europe (Colton 2016, Charap and Colton 2017). Social forces mobilized. 
Maidan Square in central Kyiv became a focal point for “Euromaidan” protests which, as the 
weeks passed, took on an all-or-nothing anti-regime flavor.  Clashes between state security 
forces and armed protesters gradually produced martyrs.  Ukraine’s government imploded on 
February 21, 2014.  Yanukovych fled Kyiv that night.  
																																																						
1 Laitin (1998), 185, emphasis added. 
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Russian special forces seized Crimea a few days later.  The popular understanding within 
Russia was that its military was “coming to the defense” of ethnic Russians at risk.2   Over the 
next few months, military drills along the border provided cover for 50,000 Russian soldiers to 
mass, signaling that Russia could invade “at a moment’s notice.”3  The areas that eventually 
became the front-lines of the conventional war – parts of Donets’k and Luhans’k – were areas 
directly adjacent to Russian territory, where secessionist militias could anticipate the possibility 
of easy military resupply.  Between February and August, on the Western side of the gradually 
solidifying conventional front lines, there were sporadic attempts by provocateurs sympathetic to 
the Russian cause to provoke general uprising in Eastern Ukraine (historical Novorossiya).  Most 
failed.  The Russian military did not send aid to militias outside of Crimea or the Donbas.  
Though widespread speculation of clandestine Russian assistance persists, and is made plausible 
by few prominent pro-Kremlin volunteers – and more facts may yet come to light – direct 
Russian intervention did not occur until July (four months after Crimea and ten weeks after the 
Ukrainian government began its “Anti-Terrorist Operation” (ATO) to forcibly re-incorporate the 
East).  In the end, Russia only sent conventional ground forces to assist secessionist militias in 
the Donbas that had already demonstrated capacity to hold government buildings for months. 
Though Russia did not engage in overt kinetic military activity outside of Crimea, 
Russian-language media broadcasts during the time represent an exemplar information warfare 
																																																						
2 The entire local government institutional apparatus, which were all remnants of the suddenly-
defunct Party of Regions, accepted Russian rule almost immediately.  That said, how much 
popular support there was for Russian military actions within the permeant population of Crimea 
will continue to be disputed.  See, for example Suslov (2015) and Faizullaev and Cornut (2017).  
3 Charap and Colton (2017), 132. 
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campaign. 4  One goal was to solidify Russian domestic opinion.  Another was to encourage 
Russian-speakers within Ukraine to take advantage of the temporary window of Ukrainian state 
incapacitation and rise up.  Petersen (2001) identifies three analytically distinct triggering 
mechanisms that can impel leaderless resistance: (1) the amplification of emotions of resentment, 
especially caused by prospective status reversals for one’s ethnic group and subordination to 
another ethnic group (especially a hated one); (2) coordination on a few focal points and infusing 
them with special symbolism; and (3) valorization of heroic resistance, assuring citizens that 
incurring small risks of martyrdom will be accompanied by large community status rewards.   
All three triggering mechanisms were prominent in the content of Russian television 
coverage of post-Maidan Ukraine.  Emphasis on status reversals for Russians was overt. A 
constant barrage of news stories – including fabricated stories about Russian boys being 
crucified by Ukrainian far-right groups and staged photographs of soldiers proudly displaying 
flags of the Azov paramilitary group alongside the NATO flag and a Nazi flag – left no doubt that 
Russians, stranded in Ukraine, were potential hostages and under imminent threat.5 The 
subordination of Russians in a new status hierarchy below Ukrainians was a reoccurring theme.6  
Valorization of heroic resistance to Ukrainian fascism was accompanied by promises of status 
rewards to patriotic volunteers from across the Former Soviet Union.   The reciprocal decision by 
																																																						
4 Reisinger and Golts (2014), 5, 3-8, Darczewska (2014), Lucas and Pomerantsev (2016), and 
Chivvis (2017). Gerasimov (2013) merits a close read, as does Beissinger (2015b), Pomerantsev 
(2015), Romanets (2017), and Snyder (2018) Chapter 5.  See also McFaul (2018), 430-40. 
5 See Peisakhin and Rozenas (2018).  For evidence of saturation of Ukraine-related stories on 
Russia’s Channel One News, see especially their Figure 1. 
6 Russia’s narrative reinforced analogies to World War II (e.g., by “NATO” with “Nazis” using 
consonant repetition, substituting “Germany” for “the EU,” the explicit claim that Maidan was a 
CIA coup, etc.) and rabid anti-Americanism.  See for example Cottiero et al. (2015). 
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the interim, post-Maidan Ukrainian government to respond to uprisings in Donbas with a 
national counterinsurgency policy called an “Anti-Terrorist Operation” (ATO) was also 
obviously strategic messaging, meant to resonate in NATO capitals and in the imaginations of 
Ukrainian patriots. 7   
This gloss is not meant as a comprehensive history, simply an amuse-bouche to whet the 
appetite for empirical exposition.   After an unexpected regime change in Kyiv, Russian-speakers 
were provided two competing narratives to make sense of the tectonic political shift.  Different 
anchoring keywords – one promulgated by the Kremlin and one the other promulgated by the 
new government Kyiv – resulted in bifurcated narratives.  These narratives containing well-
understood focal points (coup, fascist, terrorist, invasion, etc.) calibrated to exile one’s political 
enemies from respectable coalition politics.  Table 1 summarizes the competing narratives. 
  
																																																						
7 Boyd-Barrett (2017), Scholz (2016). 
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TABLE 1: COMMON COMPONENTS OF COMPETING NARRATIVES 
  
Pro-Kremlin Narrative 
 
Anti-Kremlin Narrative 
The appropriate Russia-Ukraine 
relationship, taking the relevant 
historical facts into account, ought to be 
one of … 
...natural hierarchy. Borders are 
gifts from Soviet times.  
...diplomacy between 
sovereign equals.  
Future historians, writing about the 
Maidan events, will describe them as... 
 
...a coup by far-right social forces, 
emboldened by material and moral 
support of the NATO alliance and 
Western intelligence agencies. 
...a broad-based social 
movement against an 
illegitimate government. 
Future historians, writing about Putin’s 
responses to the Maidan events and their 
aftermath— including the seizure of 
Crimea — will describe them as... 
…heroic. …criminal. 
The proximate cause of the violence in 
East Ukraine is... 
...the CIA coup which brought 
fascists to power.  
...Putin’s illegal seizure of 
the Crimean peninsula, 
leading some in Ukraine’s 
east calculated that if they 
organized militias, Russia 
might assist them too. 
Any account of the violence in East 
Ukraine is incomplete if it does not 
reference deeper structural causes, such 
as… 
…decades of Western policies to 
encircle Russia, expanding NATO 
and aggressively pushing regime 
change in post-Soviet states under 
the aegis of democracy promotion. 
… the basic incompatibility 
of values between Putin’s 
regime and the European 
Security Community. 
Soldiers fighting to secede from Eastern 
Ukraine are best described as... 
…Russian patriots. …terrorist insurgents. 
Main keyword for narrative track (by 
revealed user preferences, aggregated 
from the word-clouds found in 
supplementary materials): 
fascist terrorist 
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3. Methods: Mapping Divergent Narratives 
Starting on August 26, 2013, we connected to Twitter's streaming application 
programming interface (API), requesting only tweets with GPS coordinates. We first filtered for 
time, focusing on the 188 days from February 22, 2014 to August 28, 2014.  This filter generated 
a sample of roughly 940,000,000 geotagged tweets, which we then reduced to 6,880,623 tweets 
originating within the territorial borders of Ukraine (Crimea inclusive). 8   
We divide the sample into three periods: Crimea (dated from the flight of Viktor 
Yanukovych on February 22 until the March 15 voting referendum in Crimea); the post-Crimea 
period (in which local forces organized for secession knowing that the Ukrainian-Russian 
interstate border was in flux, which ended with the election of Petro Poroshenko via a mass-
participation voting exercise on May 26); and the subsequent conventionalized artillery war in 
the Donbas region (May 27 until August 28).  When Russian armor intervened directly in late 
August at the Battle of Ilovaisk, while at the same time official Russian diplomats were denying 
that they were doing so, it was clear that ease of seizing Crimea would not be repeated.   
Two primary considerations caused us to prefer Twitter to Facebook or VKontakte.  One 
concern was minimizing platform bias.  Platform choice was itself a signal of political 
preferences: VKontakte features heavily pro-Russian users and Facebook, more pro-Maidan ones 
																																																						
8 We foresee two distinct potential methodological objections to this methodology: (a) Twitter-
users are systematically different from non-users and, (b) that Twitter users who geotag tweets 
are different than other Twitter users.  The first concern will be addressed in the text below.  
Though we do not have an empirical strategy to address the second concern, other research teams 
employ geotagged Tweets in studies of behavior in Ukraine and find patterns consistent with 
behavioral expectations (Wilson 2017).  More research on geotagged tweet bias, however, is 
needed.  In the United States, geo-located accounts are more likely to be from smartphones, 
residents of cities, certain minorities, and higher income U.S. census tracts (Malik et al. 2015).   
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(Gruzd and Tsyganova 2015).  Twitter, by contrast, was new enough at the time that it had little 
reputation beyond being a popular social media platform that did not censor, and it contained a 
sufficient population of both pro-Kremlin and anti-Kremlin users for analysis.   
Multiple studies have shown that Twitter contained, and perhaps still does, substantial 
numbers of pro-Kremlin and anti-Kremlin Russian language accounts and tweets.  An analysis of 
Russian Twitter users from 2010-2011 shows that many users focused on Ukraine, including a 
sizable group with a positive attitude towards Russia (Kelly et al. 2012). Pro-Putin attitudes were 
popular on Twitter in Russia around the 2011 Duma and 2012 presidential elections and 
continued to track offline events (Spaiser et al. 2017). 
Second, was is more practical for our team to acquire and work with large quantities of 
Twitter data than VKontakte or Facebook data in 2014.  VKontakte’s API is neither well-
documented in English nor reliably uncensored.  Using Facebook profile data requires working 
with internal researchers, providing the company veto power at every stage of research.   
To make responsible inferences about public opinion expressed on social media, it is 
necessary to contrast earnest reproduction of keywords that signal support for the Kremlin 
narrative against the prevalence of users overtly rejecting those arguments.  For this we applied 
language filters. Metzger et al. (2015) demonstrate that many multilingual Twitter users 
performed solidarity with Maidan protesters by activating their Ukrainian identity by 
communicating on Twitter in Ukrainian, but they switched back into Russian after the success of 
Maidan.  An interpretation is that they switched back in order to participate in online information 
warfare – the replication (or self-production) of pro- or anti-Kremlin propaganda.  Our study 
restricts the investigation to Russian-language content since the Russian-speaking populations 
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(russkoiazychnoe naselenie) are the subsample of Ukrainian citizens whose beliefs would have 
been most salient to Kremlin strategists. Though the master cleavage of this war (Kalyvas 2006: 
14, 389) is the East-West (Russophone-Ukrainophone) division, our design is calibrated to 
illuminate intra-Russian-speaking discordant politics.  Our tests assume that Russian-speaking 
civilians were purposive agents competing with each other to explain the many unexpected off-
line political upheavals that took place within Ukraine during the study period.   
We employ a dictionary of keywords for parsimony and interpretability.  The six months 
in this study were marked by a series of dramatic, contentious events with their own vocabulary. 
A few weeks after the voting exercise in Crimea, coordinated protesters occupied government 
buildings in the eastern Ukrainian city of Kharkiv in April demanding a referendum on 
independence.  There was an attempt to storm a police station in Mauripol to seize heavy 
weapons.  There was a military siege on the city of Sloviansk that would last through early July 
(live-webcast, with constant YouTube updates).  In early May, violent clashes in Odessa left 42 
people dead when a building caught fire. The framing language of “fascism” and “terrorism” was 
prevalent in descriptions of all these events.  Table 2 presents the dictionaries. 9	
Two steps code the tweets.  First, a Python script filters all tweets from Ukraine so that 
each tweet in the sample contains at least one keyword from a narrative’s dictionary.  We 
considered complicating our bag-of-words approach with cases and declensions but, based on 
initial visual inspection of the sample, opted for a dictionary including only nouns and adjectives 
																																																						
9 Though complex syntax and subtle reasoning can stymie dictionary classifiers (Schwartz and 
Ungar 2015), we chose a bag of words approach because 140 character tweets are direct and 
short.  A similar “bag of words” method has been used in other event-based studies relying on 
tweets (Ramakrishnan et al. 2014; Ritter, Etzioni, and Clark 2012).  
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in the nominative case for initial filtering.  The irregular use of declensions (and irregular 
spellings generally) on Twitter may be a confound, but we opt for clear coding of meanings in 
the initial dictionary (knowing we can use these accounts to build a supervised model that will 
pull other important variants, including the same words with different declensions – see below).  
Given the much longer and larger pro-Kremlin dictionary we have no reason to believe the 
decision to search only in the nominative biases inferences systematically. 
After manually screening for automated accounts (“bots”), this process yielded 5,328 
tweets from 1,339 individual accounts.  Second, teams of Russian speakers – four native 
Ukrainians and three fluent Russian-speaking residents of North America – read each tweet and 
coded it as pro-Kremlin or anti-Kremlin. This second step is necessary both because irony 
confuses unsupervised computer classifiers and sometimes has poor inter-coder reliability and 
because visual inspection was the most reliable way to spot automated accounts.  To understand 
the demographics and professions of these users, we searched Google, Facebook, and VKontakte 
for each user in our sample.   Tentative results suggests that the sample skews slightly young 
(16-36) and male, but with a bulk of accounts unidentifiable on these characteristics.10   
Having identified the 5,328 tweets containing at least one of the keywords from Table 2, 
we built two separate supervised models to identify pro-Kremlin and anti-Kremlin tweets that 
our dictionaries might have missed.  Hand-coded tweets were used as a training set on which we 
built each model.  Through processes described in our Supplementary Materials we stemmed all 
																																																						
10 Only 24 accounts, and 196 tweets, are from bots, based on manual inspection.  All hand-coded 
analysis in the paper’s main results excludes them. 
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words, removed stopwords, and dropped all Foursquare-account generated data. 11  The resulting 
classifiers identify 58,689 tweets as pro-Kremlin and 107,041 as anti-Kremlin, a total of 166,454 
tweets. Training the supervised models provided us a higher proportion of pro-Russia narrative 
than the dictionary, bringing our results more in line with other studies of the Ukrainian and 
Russian Twittersphere (Kelly et al. 2012, Spaiser et al. 2017, Wilson 2017).   
  
																																																						
11	The first output of the classifier identifies 204,189 tweets as concerning either narrative, 
144,776 of which are anti-Kremlin.  Validating the output showed many were of the form of 
“I’m at [place]”, indicating that the tweet was created on the app Foursquare. Since no 
Foursquare tweets had appeared in the hand-coded data, this confound was not discovered until 
the referee process.  Simply removing all tweets that start with “I’m at” (a total of 37,735) from 
the study did not change results substantively, but we rely on the smaller dataset excluding 
Foursquare data for all analysis in this paper.  See Supplementary Materials for more details. 
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TABLE 2: KEYWORDS DICTIONARIES FOR INITIAL CODING 
 
Anti-Kremlin Dictionary (English) 
Terrorist 
Terrorists 
Terrorism 
Anti-Kremlin Dictionary (Russian) 
tеррорист 
террористы 
терроризм 
 
Pro-Kremlin Dictionary (English) 
Radical, radicals 
Right-Wing Radical (adj.) 
Nationalist Radical (adj.) 
Right-Wing Extremist (adj., fem.) 
Right Terrorism 
Extremist (adj.), Extremism 
Neo-Nazism, Neo-Nazi 
Nazis, Nazism, Nazi (fem.) 
Nationalist, Nationalist (adj.) 
Nationalist-Radical (adj.) 
National Minorities 
Ultra-nationalist (adj.) 
Fascism, Fascist (adj.) 
Mercenaries, Fighters 
Antisemites 
Russophobes 
Pro-Kremlin Dictionary (Russian) 
радикальные, радикалы 
праворадикальные 
национал-радикальный 
правоэкстремистская 
правый терроризм 
экстремистский, экстремизм 
неонацизм, неонацистский 
нацисты, нацизм, нацистская 
националист, националистическое 
национал-радикальный 
нацменьшинства 
ультранационалистические 
фашизм, фашистский 
наемники, боевики 
антисемиты 
русофобы 
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4. Results 
4a. Results  
The keyword filter finds a large majority of the tweets (85%) to be anti-Kremlin.  This 
result surprises, given that the pro-Kremlin selection dictionary is much larger than the anti-
Kremlin dictionary.12 Figure 3 is a time plot of the raw data, organized by narrative track.  The 
dotted lines in this figure divide the sample into three periods discussed above. Until mid-May, 
the two narratives peak on the same days, suggesting an online clash of narratives as locals used 
their accounts to narrate the same off-line events competitively (signaling solidarity by 
performing the pro-Kremlin/anti-Maidan line or performing anti-Kremlin/pro-Maidan line for an 
audience in the social network).13  
																																																						
12 The proportion our sample may be higher than 85%.  Hand-coded tweets from the dictionary 
method contain 273 clearly pro-Kremlin, 4,338 clearly anti-Kremlin, and another 543 with 
disputable content (e.g., with inter-coder variation across the options of “neither” or “both”). 
13 The Supplementary Materials contains evidence of spatial and temporal correlations between 
social media behaviors that earnestly reproduce the anti-Ukraine (“fascist”) narrative and ironic 
“trolling” behaviors (using the fascist keywords, but intending to mock that position).    
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Figure	3 
 
CAPTION:	 Vertical	 dotted	 lines	 divide	 the	 sample	 into	 three	 periods:	 Crimea	 (dated	 from	 the	 flight	 of	 Viktor	
Yanukovych	until	the	March	15	referendum);	the	post-Crimea	period	in	which	local	forces	organized	for	secession	
(March	 16	 to	 May	 26);	 and	 the	 subsequent	 conventionalized	 artillery	 war	 in	 the	 Donbas	 region	 (May	 27	 until	
August	28).	Cauterized	uprisings	by	Russian-speakers	 in	various	parts	of	Novorossiya	occur	 in	 late	April	and	early	
May.	The	Ukrainian	Government’s	ATO	(“Anti-Terrorist	Operation”)	 is	 initiated	 in	May.	The	visible	outlier	 in	anti-
Russian	Twitter	activity	on	July	17	is	descriptions	of	the	downing	of	Malaysian	Airlines	Flight	17	as	terrorism. 
 
The greatest density of pro-Kremlin tweets occurred in April and May. During this 
period, the Russian military had consolidated control of Crimea, but it was unclear whether the 
Kremlin would come to the assistance of militias who seized territory and advertised their desire 
to secede. The anti-Kremlin narrative did not emerge as dominant until the government’s 
dedicated counterinsurgency policy (the ATO), which transformed “terrorism” into the focal 
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point for resistance.  By early July, the anti-Kremlin narrative had a clear advantage on Russian-
language social media.  
Just as in all highly-polarized news coverage, in some cases these competitive narratives 
“latched on” to the same offline events, providing different frames for their description, and in 
other cases the narratives “change the subject” and simply focus on different events.  The Twitter 
Streaming API provides only 1% of tweets and thus prevents the reconstruction of full threads.  
We must make inferences about offline events based on what amount to conversation snippets.  
It is still straightforward to see observe narratives in tandem.  In the immediate aftermath of the 
downing of Malaysian Airlines Flight 17 (MH17) on July 17, 2014, Pro-Kremlin tweets 
promulgated the narrative that the Ukrainian military had shot down its own plane.  Anti-
Kremlin tweets promulgated the more standard narrative outside of Russia (that a BUK missile 
had been fired by separatists and that Russia was a state supporter of terrorism).  We manually 
analyzed the subsample of 567 tweets from our human-coded sample from the day before to the 
week after  and found that even in this week, when the airline crash provided a clear focal point 
for news coverage, a plurality of tweets in our sample referred to other aspects of the conflict 
(e.g., movement of weapons across the Russian border, POWs captured and exchanged, SBU 
operations, stockpiled weapons, battlefronts in Luhansk, individuals tweeting the location of 
separatists to authorities, etc.) or employed generic name-calling.  Approximately twice as many 
anti-Kremlin tweets as pro-Kremlin tweets (41% compared to 20%) in our sample referenced the 
event, suggesting it was more common for the pro-Russian narrative to dwell on other themes. 
The front lines, where Russian military intervention would have been operationally 
feasible at low cost, are of special interest.  Figure 4 replicates Figure 3, but using the larger 
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machine-learning dataset and only examining geotagged tweets generated in Novorossiya.  This 
region is where uprisings of ethnic Russians never occurred, but if they had, might have been 
joined with logistical support from the Russian military.14  Note that the two narratives track each 
other relatively evenly for the first two periods, suggesting an ongoing battle on social media for 
hearts and minds in Russian-speaking communities in Novorossiya in the early months of the 
conflict followed by dominance of anti-Kremlin  messaging in the third period once conventional 
frontlines solidified.   
The Supplementary Materials show the same graph using data from all of Ukraine, and, 
not surprisingly, the Anti-Kremlin discourse clearly dominates the entire period.  We also 
undertake two additional robustness checks to ensure that automated accounts (“bots”) do not 
drive the results from the machine learning models. First, we submit every user to Botometer, a 
service that produces a probability estimate that an account is a bot and drop tweets from any 
account with a probability of being a bot greater than or equal to .4 (Varol et al. 2017).  The 
Anti-Kremlin narrative dominates the Pro-Kremlin one even more once these tweets are 
removed.  Second, we drop tweets from any account at or above the 95th percentile of the tweet 
frequency or friend:follower distribution, as these behaviors are common features of bots (Bessi 
and Ferrara 2016).  Dropping tweets on these criteria does not substantively alter our inferences.  
																																																						
14 The quote from Vladimir Putin in the epigraph, openly questioning the legitimacy of the border 
between Ukraine and Russia, was delivered with scripted sincerity and references these oblasts.   
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FIGURE	4	
 
CAPTION:	The	subset	of	the	raw	data	from	the	machine-learning	dataset	(N=166,454)	after	dropping	,	replicating	
Figure	3,	using	only	data	generated	from	oblasts	in	historical	Novorossiya.	In	March	and	early	April,	the	pro-Kremlin	
narrative	ebbed	and	flowed	but	was	generally	dominant	in	the	Novorossiya	sample.		As	the	conventional	warfare	
phase	gets	underway,	the	anti-Kremlin	narrative	begins	to	dominate.						
	
To enable spatial comparisons across Ukraine, we exploit the variation in the prevalence 
of each narrative across oblasts as a fraction of overall Russian Twitter behavior.  We first 
calculate the percentage of all Russian-language geotagged tweets originating within an oblast.15  
																																																						
15 We did not aggregate to a lower geographic level, such as city or raion, because of lack of 
tweets available in our hand-coded sample, especially if we also wanted to subdivide the data 
into smaller bins by time period.   
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This number is the denominator.  To calculate the numerator, we repeat the oblast-level 
calculation for the population of tweets that contain keywords from either narrative track.  The 
percent of all tweets in Russian from each oblast (Ai), the percent of all pro-Kremlin tweets in 
Russian from each oblast (Bi), and the percent of all anti-Kremlin tweets from each oblast (Ci) 
can be used to compare the percent difference between Bi and Ai, and the percent difference 
between Ci and Ai.  This quantity measures the over- or under-production of pro-Kremlin (Bi) or 
anti-Kremlin (Ci) tweets, against an oblast-specific production baseline.  So long as we observe 
some pro-Kremlin behavior in every oblast there is enough data to make comparisons across 
space. 16   
The non-parametric nature of this operationalization generates two advantages. First, it 
mechanically controls for an oblast’s Russian-speaking Twitter population and any omitted 
demographic, social, economic, technological, or political variables that might correlate with the 
overall percentage of Russian-language Twitter users (since the denominator of each oblast is the 
total number of Russian-language geotagged tweets). Second, it avoids mechanically capturing 
the East-West (Rusian-Ukrainian) cleavage since it incorporates oblast-specific amounts of 
Russian production.  For example, it is not surprising that Crimea would produce a lot of pro-
Russia tweets.  What is surprising is that it produces more than would be expected given its 
baseline production of tweets in Russian.  This measure therefore captures the residual “cultural 
																																																						
16 For example, in one period, Crimea produced 4.3% of all Russian-language tweets, but it 
produced 10.93% of all Russian-language tweets reproducing the pro-Kremlin narrative.  Our 
method would calculate that it produced 154.19% (10.93-4.30)/(4.30) more pro-Kremlin tweets 
than the baseline expectation.  Results are robust to an alternative model specification in which 
the denominator is the percentage of all geotagged tweets originating from within each oblast 
regardless of language.   
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package” of pro-Kremlin attitudes that outlived the institutional implosion of the Party of 
Regions.  
Figure 5 displays relative over- or underproduction of narrative track keywords by oblast 
using the full sample of our hand-coded data (N=5,328).  Oblasts are arrayed from west to east.  
The clear outlier is Crimea and its capital Sevastopol’.17   The other oblasts where social media 
users reproduced the pro-Russia (“fascism”) narrative were Transcarpathia, Khmel’nyts’kyy, 
Zhytomyr, Odessa, Dnipropetrovs’k, Kharkiv, Zaporizhahia, and Donets’k.  Over-production of 
the anti-Kremlin narrative is more common in the West, but also, crucially, in Mykolayiv, 
Donets’k, and Luhans’k.  These areas are precisely where it would have been easiest for Russia 
to expand if it wanted to.  The Spearman rank correlation between this relative production 
measure and the proportion of pro-Kremlin tweets by oblast is .58.  That many people in these 
supposedly pro-Russia oblasts were against Russia may have given pause to military planners. 
Figure 6 replicates Figure 5 with the machine-coded dataset.  Broad trends are similar, 
but two differences deserve noticing.  First, the Crimean oblasts are no longer extreme outliers.  
Second, the East-West dimension of the data is now much more pronounced. Russian-language 
Twitter behaviors in the 7 oblasts that were formerly part of the Habsburg Empire systematically 
																																																						
17 We speculate the relative over-production of pro-Russia discourse in Crimea is explained 
jointly by a few causal processes: (a) over-production as a reflection of an authentic broad-based 
outpouring of support for rejoining the homeland; (b) information operations conducted by pro-
Kremlin agents that were not indigenous citizens of the peninsula; (c) the Russian military 
presence deterred the production of the “anti-Kremlin” narrative by indigenous citizens, creating 
strategic self-censorship by citizens who left the Twitter-sphere once military occupation was a 
fait accompli; (d) the linked claim that in other parts of Ukraine, post-Maidan residual state 
capacity deterred the irredentist Russian narrative, but those constraints ceased to be present in 
Crimea very early in our study.  Our design cannot disentangle these mechanisms.  Since Twitter 
users are anyway not representative of the entire population, these trends in our data should not 
be interpreted as evidence that Russian annexation was overwhelmingly popular with the 
population, an “authentic” victory for national self-determination, or anything of the sort. 
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under-produce the focal point keywords in the pro-Kremlin dictionary and over-produce 
keywords from the anti-Kremlin dictionary.  The opposite trend occurs in eight of the nine 
eastern-most oblasts, and also in Odessa.  The most active “front lines” of the social media 
conflict were Mykolayiv and Luhans’k.  The Spearman rank correlation between this relative 
production measure and the proportion of pro-Kremlin tweets by oblast is .62.  Figure 7 includes 
two paired visual maps of the data in Figure 6, with oblasts shaded corresponding to their 
relative narrative production.   
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FIGURE	5	
 
CAPTION:	Relative	over-	or	underproduction	of	narrative	track	keywords,	by	oblast,	using	the	full	sample	of	hand-
coded	data.	Oblasts	are	arrayed	roughly	from	west	to	east.	The	Pro-	Kremlin	outliers	are	Crimea	and	its	capital	city,	
Sevastopol.	 Over-	 production	 of	 Anti-Kremlin	 narratives	 takes	 place	 in	 the	 west,	 in	 the	 center	 Kyiv,	 and	 on	 the	
military	frontline	of	the	Donbas.		
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FIGURE	6	
 
CAPTION:	 Relative	 over-	 or	 underproduction	 of	 narrative	 track	 keywords,	 by	 oblast,	 using	 the	 full	 sample	 of	
machine-coded	tweets.	Oblasts	are	arrayed	roughly	 from	west	 to	east.	Historical	Novorossiya	over-produces	pro-
Kremlin	 narratives	 and	 under-produces	 anti-Kremlin	 narratives.	 Mykolayiv,	 Kyiv,	 Sevastopol’,	 and	 Luhans’k	 are	
notable	as	oblast	where	both		
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FIGURE	7	
CAPTION:	 Relative	 over-	 or	 underproduction	 of	 narrative	 track	 keywords,	 by	 oblast,	 using	 the	 full	 sample	 of	
machine-coded	tweets.	To	visualize,	we	bin	the	results:	whether	the	oblast	produced	50-100%	fewer	tweets	than	
expected,	 0-50%	 fewer,	 no	 change,	 0-50%	 more,	 50-100%	 more,	 or	 more	 than	 double	 the	 number	 of	 tweets	
expected.	Darker	 colors	 indicate	a	 relative	 surge	 in	 tweets	 containing	 target	keywords	 relative	 to	overall	 Twitter	
traffic	in	the	district.		
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4b. Interpretation 
Our supposition is that spatiotemporal trends in these online social behaviors would have 
correlated with the offline social behaviors that would have been easily visible to civilians, 
journalists, or embedded observers reporting to Russian intelligence.  The behaviors described 
spatially in Figure 2, and the main results in Figure 3 and Figure 4 reveal the limits of the 
Kremlin’s capacity to compete with the West in soft power projection.  The Kremlin’s narrative 
of events seems to have found limited reception in the Russkii Mir, even in Russia’s historical 
sphere of influence, even for a population historically sympathetic to its message (such as those 
living in parts of Novoroissiya that had reliably delivered votes to the Party of Regions), even 
when Kremlin-influenced producers monopolized the airwaves (Peisakhin and Rozenas 2018).  
All factors suggested, a priori, hegemonic dominance of the pro-Kremlin narrative.  Ex-post 
analysis of outcomes reveals a decidedly mixed picture.  
These data suggest that a key point of failure for a Russian “social tip” towards wide-
spread pro-Kremlin sedition against the post-Maidan Ukrainian political regime occurred in 
Luhans’k.  Eventually this oblast emerged as the front line of conventional warfare.  In Figure 7, 
while the patterns of production in Luhans’k are not strongly differentiated from the rest of 
Novorossiya in terms of pro-Kremlin production, this oblast was a focal point for anti-Kremlin 
social media activity.  The conventional frontline was a front line in a war of ideas first: the 
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influx of military activity brought volunteer journalists with Twitter accounts.  This altered the 
sample to reflect a different set of social dynamics (and social media dynamics) than elsewhere.18  
 Figures 8A, 8B, and 8C allow visual inspection of the 166,454 tweets in a rough time 
series.  The progression in the variation in attitudes by Russian-speakers in Ukrainians oblasts 
emerges in these snapshots, as a Russian intelligence analyst might have seen them.  Data from 
the first period, February 22 through March 15 (Figure 8A), suggests there was support for the 
Russian narrative, and a relative dearth of anti-Kremlin pushback, in territories near Crimea.   
Occupied Sevastopol’ was, to our surprise, a site of contestation according to these data.   
Kharkiv especially, but also Zaporizhzhia, Dnipropetrovs’k, and Odessa, might have been 
tempting targets for annexation in March and April.  Between mid-March and late May (Figure 
8B), there were a few of attempts by pro-Russia forces to engineer uprisings.  The anti-Kremlin 
tweets in Mykolayiv in period 2 (8B) probably reflect sentiments by residents, after uprisings in 
Odessa, expressing fears that Russian planners might be tempted to create a land bridge linking 
Crimea to Transniestria. After the election of Petro Poroshenko, the consolidation of the post-
Maidan Ukrainian state, and the intensification of artillery war (Figure 8C), Russian military 
intervention would have been more difficult.  Outside of Mykolayiv and Luhans’k Russian-
speaking social media users in Novorossiya continued to be relatively receptive to the Kremlin’s 
point of view in this period.  This interpretative exercise is not meant to be the final word on 
public sentiment by Russian-speaking communities in Novorossiya – just an exposition of how 
these tools could have been used by a computer-literate observer monitoring social media trends. 
																																																						
18 Luhans’k is not the only oblast that over-produces both narratives. Mykolayiv, Kyiv, Kyiv City, 
and occupied Sevastopol’ are also sites of contestation.   
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FIGURE	8	ARRAY	
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4c. Caveats and Speculations 
Twitter was essentially an anti-Kremlin platform in 2014 during our study period 
everywhere in Ukraine except Crimea.   Our supposition is that spatiotemporal trends in online 
behaviors, which we can measure from a distance, correlate with the offline signaling behaviors 
that would have been taking in Russian-speaking communities, but it is worth re-emphasizing 
that extrapolating wider trends in public opinion from these data is fraught. There may well have 
been a hidden density of pro-Kremlin Russian-speakers that decamped from Twitter and 
continued to communicate on Tor, in chat rooms, on forums, or using platforms beyond the 
scope of our analysis. 	That said, social media communications clearly can be used to estimate 
levels of support for seditious political attitudes such as secession.  Since border revisions are 
very rare, and since social media is very new, inferential limitations should be made explicit. 	
Our decisions targeted the opinions of a single population (Russian-speaking Twitter 
users residing within Ukraine) during a complicated period of institutional collapse and state 
weakness (February-August 2014).  Context-specific variables matter.  We make no claim to 
external validity.  Twitter is not a perfect substitute for representative public opinion sampling.19  
Different kinds of people do not use social media for different reasons.  Even for those that 
enthusiastically “opt-in” to online politics, every 140-character tweet (or status on Facebook) is 
not an authentic political act.  There is exciting behavioral work to be done, but until there is 
academic convergence on best practices for how to interpret spontaneous performances on social 
media, frontier-mapping exercises like ours should be treated with cautious care.   
																																																						
19 Yet we are aware of no public polling during this period in Crimea, Luhans’k, or Donets'k.  The 
shortcomings of social media should be weighed against the ability to conduct studies that 
danger would otherwise forbid.  
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Three assumptions must hold to justify online observation as measurement for offline 
behavior. First, it must be the case that individuals in our sample do not maintain a performance 
identity on social media that promulgates information contrary to offline beliefs.  The same 
people should share the same ideas on Twitter as on other platforms – and, more importantly, as 
around kitchen tables or on soccer fields.  This assumption is plausible but contestable.20  
Context-specific research is needed to sort extremist cheap talk on social media from sincerely-
held extremist beliefs, especially for populations flirting with radicalization in active war zones.  
Second, any study of community signaling behaviors tacitly assumes that the imagined 
audiences for tweets are local friend and family networks.  Spatial comparisons of production 
patterns across oblasts may provide a window into public sentiment if density of production is 
related to latent characteristics of the communities Twitter users are trying to influence (and have 
private information on, as community members). This assumption is plausible, and consistent 
with academic understandings (McGee et all 2011), but more site-specific research is needed. 
Third, the native population of an area must produce the bulk of the data in a sample.  It 
would be a huge problem if the majority of data coming from non-community members such as 
journalists or mercenaries.  Strategic efforts to create a false impression of local support through 
the use of bots or clandestine operatives (which is why we laboriously coded user characteristics) 
could also contaminate inferences.  Manual inspection of the 5,328 tweets and 1,339 accounts 
convinced us that this study contains relatively few accounts originating from outside an oblast, 
																																																						
20 See Hill et all (2016), Malik et al. (2015).  Because behaviors on Twitter replicate known 
offline phenomena such as Dunbar’s Number (Dunbar et al. 2015) and diurnal patterns of 
activity (Golder and Macy 2011) we are cautiously comfortable with this assumption.  For a 
more thorough defense of measuring offline data with online sources, see Steinert-Threlkeld 
(2018). 
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but we admit caution on this point.  A sophisticated information operation, if prepared years in 
advance, could foil visual inspection of the sort that we employ in this paper. 
Weighed against these concerns are certain advantages of analyzing data from social 
media platforms.  Unstructured data from populations that would be otherwise impossible to 
reach (in this case Crimea or behind the lines of control in the Donbas) can be analyzed.  Unlike 
surveys, there is no attempt to claim population representativeness, so neither social desirability 
bias nor strategic non-response confound inferences.  Unlike ethnographic observation, which is 
limited by the range of the researcher’s own sensory equipment, research designs that employ 
social media data can compare patterns of production that occur at the same time in many places.  
Perhaps the most salient objection to these results is that they are not novel.  The East-
West split has defined Ukrainian politics since independence (Arel 2002, Barrington and Herron 
2004, Darden and Grzymala-Busse 2006, Clem and Craumer 2008, Constant 2011, Constant 
2012, Frye 2015, Zhukov 2016).  Using new social media data to draw costly maps that 
reproduce old maps (such as the second map in Figure 7) may be criticized as old wine in new 
bottles.  There are three reasons not to dismiss this paper’s methodology or results so quickly.  
First, unlike a cross-sectional survey, these data mirror the series of updates that would 
have arrived, in real time, to Russian military personnel during a period of crisis bargaining.  
New information would have been at a premium for Kremlin policymakers. Maidan, the 
implosion of the Party of Regions, and Russia’s seizure of Crimea were major events.  Old 
understandings of public opinion would have been held up under close scrutiny.  In that moment 
of crisis, no party, academic or military, would have had time to collect or analyze survey data.   
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Second, this research has generated new knowledge.  The outline of Novorossiya is 
included in Figure 2 as a reminder that old maps are not all useful guides to high-stakes behavior 
by Russian-speaking communities.  There were many surprises among our research team as we 
conducted this study.  The dominant narrative used by political elites in Kyiv describing this 
period is one of Russian agents sowing discord (which complements the dominant narrative in 
the United States is that Russia is an innovator in the information warfare domain).  As such, we 
anticipated finding widespread geographic support for Russia (expressed in the “fascism” 
narrative) and extensive evidence of astroturfing (bots or dubious accounts reproducing Russian 
talking points).  Neither appeared.  Only 24 accounts, responsible for 196 tweets, were from bots.  
Outside of occupied Crimea, most Russian speakers did not use Twitter as a forum to voice 
support for Russia.  The facts were surprising to our team but stubbornly clear. 
Our supposition is that the failure of the pro-Kremlin narrative to catch on would have 
been an important source of military intelligence for Russian planners in 2014. Recall that 
having begun the process of redrawing the post-Soviet territorial map, it was not clear where 
Russia would define the natural end-point to its irredentism.  Russian mechanized units could 
have moved quickly to establish facts on the ground if they had expected to find a population 
ready to greet them as liberators.  The frontlines of Ukraine’s conflict could easily be many 
kilometers further west.  Some claim that Russia did not go further because its leadership feared 
international censure, but Russian diplomats could have easily justified the action, much as they 
justified Crimea, by invoking familiar “Responsibility to Protect” and “self-determination” 
arguments.  That works if and only if many Russians call for help, however.  The information 
that military planners needed for a more ambitious policy, but did not have, is whether they were 
likely to encounter resistance.  If the Kremlin had access to data like ours, they would have 
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known that they were unlikely to be greeted as liberators by many Russian-speaking 
communities – even in the Eastern Donbas.  The Russian-Ukrainian interstate border moved only 
as far as Russian forces could advance while incurring no occupation costs – Crimea, and no 
further. 
Third, the question of whether new kinds of technologies – in this case social media –  
enable irredentist mobilization is intrinsically worthy of study.  If we are correct, social media 
has under-appreciated implications for revisionist powers trying to assess occupation costs 
prospectively.  This is analytically separate from other well-analyzed applications of social 
media (e.g., lowering the costs of collective/connective action, lowering the costs for state actors 
surveillance of dissident networks, real-time source-checking of “fake news”, etc.).  When war 
weaponized radio and film, states had a comparative advantage in what might be called 
“memetic supply” (the production and dissemination of narrative embedded in memorable 
slogans, catchy songs, and viral images).  Until the recent proliferation of inexpensive 
smartphones, states did not have the capability to reliably and systematically measure “memetic 
demand” in real-time.  Our empirical results suggest that this capability probably already exists.  
 
5. Conclusion 
Social media behaviors are public signals analogous to scrawling graffiti, whistling a 
patriotic tune on a bus, talking loudly about politics in a public setting, or flying a flag.  Since 
social media users add content to platforms in order to communicate ideas to their social 
network, the prevalence of overtly political behaviors can provide important clues about the 
political dispositions of the community that is the imagined audience for those messages.  
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We present no evidence supporting the claim that Russian military actions in 2014 were 
altered as a result of re-purposing social media trends for military intelligence – merely a variety 
of evidence consistent with our conjecture that such re-purposing is now possible.  Social media 
data are straightforward to analyze systematically and can be collected at relatively low cost.  
Following Kostyuk and Zhukov (2017: 3), we favor the analogy between information warfare 
techniques and airplanes at the start of the First World War.  Recall that planes were used 
primarily for reconnaissance before they were used to drop bombs.  Conventional militaries are 
just beginning to explore the ways that emergent information technologies can shape battlefields.  
As techniques for real-time data mining become commodified, they will be integrated into best 
practices for counterinsurgency (Berman, Felter, and Shapiro 2018) and, more generally, into 
military planning.  This paper has shown one way in which they could have been useful.  
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Post-Soviet Affairs: Supplementary Materials 
 
1. Hand-Coding the Tweets 
 
We manually coded each of the 1,535 accounts which authored at least one geotagged 
tweet in our sample.  A Kyiv-based team of four used a combination of public searches on 
Google, Facebook, and VKontakte.  As explained in the main paper, the initial purpose of this 
exercise was to ensure that we were collecting information that would be meaningful evidence of 
social attitudes within our population, rather than artifacts of sophisticated efforts to use social 
media to “plant evidence” of attitudes as part of the information warfare campaign.  We did not 
record names of users out of respect to human subjects, but coded respondents on profession, 
sex, age, and primary language.  As Table SM-1.1 shows, the sample is dominated by people 
whose ages are indeterminate from publicly searchable online data.  Other information was 
easily discernable.  Automated accounts were particularly easy to identify – conditional on 
someone taking the time to search the user profile, “bots” are distinguishable.  Contrary to our 
prior beliefs based on knowledge of Russia’s information warfare strategy, few bots (196) enter 
our sample.  Also surprising was that bot accounts were not all pro-Kremlin.  As can be seen in 
the summary statistics Table SM-1.5, bot accounts were somewhat more prevalent in Kiev City 
(which we expected), Khmel’nyts’kyy, Poltava, Zaporizhzhia and Dnipropetrovs’k (which we 
did not expect, though in most of these cases the high percentage is due to the low denominator).  
Our going theory is that providing GPS coordinates to a tweet was, and is, not considered 
important for the bot’s effectiveness, eliminating them mechanically by our geotagging filter.   
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TABLE SM-1.1: SOCIAL MEDIA BEHAVIORS BY IDENTITY 
 Individuals Tweets 
Academic 7 20 
Blogger/Activist 41 172 
Celebrity 3 3 
Journalist 49 85 
Military 5 14 
Political 7 12 
Professional 303 675 
Student 529 743 
Unknown 332 3446 
Worker 63 158 
Total 1,535 5,328 
 
If Russian intelligence had been interested in populations’ receptiveness to irredentism, 
they would presumably have eliminated bots as a source of noise.  In order to paint a picture 
most consistent with what they might have seen, we drop all bots from the descriptive statistics 
in the paper (Figure 3 and Figure 5) and in these supplementary materials.  Importantly, we 
found that bots have low values for median followers.  Since automated accounts do not have 
many followers, whatever they are saying cannot possibly be seen by many people.  We opted to 
include tweets originating in automated accounts when we later built our ML classifier.   
 
 3 
 
FIGURE SM-1 
 
CAPTION:	Most,	but	not	all,	tweets	in	our	sample	were	in	Russian.			A	tweet	originating	in	the	territory	of	Ukraine	
in	English	or	Ukrainian	 that	also	contained	a	keyword	was	almost	guaranteed	 to	be	 identified	using	 the	anti-
Kremlin	 keyword	 dictionary.	 	 The	 dominance	 of	 the	 pro-West	 narrative,	 in	 spite	 of	 the	 larger	 pro-Kremlin	
selection	dictionary,	is	very	clear	in	this	particular	visualization	of	the	data.		
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FIGURE SM-2 
 
 
CAPTION:	This	figure	is	identical	to	Figure	4	except	using	data	from	all	of	Ukraine	rather	than	just	Novorossiya.		
The	Anti-Kremlin	narrative	more	clearly	dominates	the	full	sample.	
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Demographic characteristics of the sample and summaries of how characteristics map 
onto the two narratives are presented in Figure SM-1, Table SM1.1 and Table SM1.2. 
Languages other than Russian seem to have been pre-filtered by users to signal anti-Russian 
attitudes.  Our filters searched exclusively for Russian words, but some returned tweets written 
primarily in English or Ukrainian.  Only 1.72% of Ukrainian tweets in our sample were pro-
Kremlin, compared to 8.54% of English tweets and 12.17% of Russian-language tweets in our 
sample.  In the course of cleaning the data we eliminated approximately 300 garbled or 
incoherent messages, messages written primarily in non-study languages (Romanian, Spanish), 
and separated automated accounts (bots), which explains the slightly lower number of tweets in 
tables below.  For 34.39% of the accounts (528/1535), it was not possible to identify the user’s 
profession, but, again, our team was confident the account belonged to a person, not a bot.  These 
“unknown” individuals also often produced many different tweets and thus comprised the bulk 
of the data, as Figure SM-1 makes clear.  An even more dramatic visualization that Figure 3 in 
the main paper of just how dominant the anti-Russian narrative is in these overall data.  The 
same story is clear in Figure SM-2, which replicates the main paper result in Figure 4 but for 
the entire territory of Ukraine. 
The three groups that tweet the most are students, professionals, and unidentified 
accounts.   Figure SM1 displays tweet production as it varies across language, profession, and 
narrative track.  Though the majority of the tweets were anti-Kremlin, certain professional 
groups, at least when tweeting in Russian, were systematically more likely than other groups to 
voice opinions consistent with the pro-Kremlin narrative.  The three groups with the greatest 
concentration of pro-Kremlin narrative were the military (35.71%), celebrities (33.33%), and 
workers (27.22%).  The three groups with the greatest concentration of anti-Kremlin narrative 
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were activists and bloggers (94.18%), politicians (91.67%), and unknown (92.95%), with 
professionals not far behind at 87.41%.  Our favored interpretation is that young professionals 
and students engaged with state-backed actors engaged in psychological operations.  Some 
celebrities chased the story, seeking controversy.  Exploring these suppositions would require 
access to the entire data, rather than just the 1% sample made available to academic researchers. 
TABLE SM-1.2: SOCIAL MEDIA BEHAVIORS BY LANGUAGE, AGE GROUP 
By Language 
 Pro-Kremlin Anti-Kremlin Total 
English 17 182 199 
Russian 575 3916 4725 
Ukrainian 11 627 638 
Total 603 4725 5,328 
By Age 
0-15 45 99 144 
16-24 247 786 1033 
25-36 114 1058 1172 
37-60 57 293 350 
61+ 2 29 31 
Unknown 138 2460 2598 
Total 603 4725 5,328 
  
The sample skews young: only 31 tweets are from individuals over the age of 60 and the 
bulk of tweets are from users aged 16-36. Very few accounts (7) belong to self-identified 
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government officials or state bureaus.  Only 49 belong to news organizations.  Twenty- four 
accounts, producing 196 tweets, were automated accounts (bots).  Though it was a source of 
discussion between coauthors, we ultimately opted to keep these few accounts in our regression 
models of human-coded tweets (reported below) and in the training set we used to code the 
larger dataset to avoid “throwing away data,” once we confirmed (a) excluding bots did not alter 
core results (see regression robustness checks below), and (b) that only our human coders could 
convincingly discern intent to overcome the irony confound (discussed below).  
 The most important previous work on the use of Twitter in Ukraine for our study at the 
time of initial analysis was a pre-publication version of Metzger et al. (2015).  This paper 
analyzed behaviors during the same period and reported users were likely to tweet politically in 
Russian, even if their default language on Twitter was Ukrainian, after Crimea.  Their study used 
self-reported language of origin as the decision criteria for whether to include tweets in the study 
rather than geotagging.  As discussed in the main text, we had some residual anxiety about 
whether a sample of only geotagged Tweets might somehow be non-representative.  In order to 
assuage these concerns among ourselves, we replicated one of their core results using our 
geotagged database.   Figure SM-3 extends the periods of observation back a full month before 
the Maidan protests turned violent.  Our hand-coded evidence provides important confirmation 
of Metzger et al. (2015)’s theory:  In our data, the switch to Russian occurred among politically-
activated individuals engaging in online political contention, a phenomenon distinct from the rest 
of the online communication occurring on Twitter (such as social mobilization for Maidan, 
sharing music videos, etc.).  Before they began rebutting claims embedded in Russia’s irredentist 
information warfare campaign, many were communicating in Ukrainian on Twitter.  Figure SM-
3 suggests to us that the Ukrainian Twitter-sphere switched to Russian to tell competing stories.  
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FIGURE SM-3 
 
CAPTION:	The	frequency	of	tweeting	in	Russian	increases	after	Viktor	Yanukovych	flees	the	country.	 	The	solid	
line	 is	all	accounts	 in	our	 sample;	 the	dotted	 line,	 for	only	 those	accounts	 that	engage	 in	pro-Kremlin	or	anti-
Kremlin	narrative	construction.		While	accounts	generating	tweets	that	use	politically-charged	keywords	clearly	
switch	into	Russian	after	the	Maidan	events,	a	similar	change	is	not	seen	in	the	full	sample		
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FIGURE SM2
CAPTION: The frequency of tweeting in Russian increases after 
Viktor Yanukovych flees the country.  The solid line is all 
accounts in our sample; he dotted li e, for only those ccounts 
that e gage in pro-Kremlin or anti-Kremlin narr tive 
construction. While accounts generating tweets that use 
politically-charged keywords clearly switch into Russian after the 
Maidan events, a similar change is not seen in the full sample. 
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	 Figure SM-4 shows the 100 most common words based on the content of initial tweets 
selected by the dictionary sorting. The results are shown in word clouds scaled by size to reflect 
prevalence in the overall hand-coded sample.  Russian speakers will be able to quickly parse the 
two polarized narratives.  The anti-Kremlin cloud (above) has “Terrorists” as the most prevalent 
word.   The pro-Kremlin cloud below) has “Right” (a reference to the Right Sektor, ultra-
nationalist right-wing party that played a key role in the Maidan events) as the most prevalent 
word.  Careful readers will also that, even though it is not one of our keywords, “terrorists” is 
quite prominent in the pro-Kremlin word cloud, as well. 
Though the data passed a basic face validity test, we struggled with user intent – and in 
particular with what we call amongst ourselves the irony confound.  Consider the layers of irony 
embedded the phrase: “This is a moment that you do not want to be seen celebrating, because 
people celebrating victory over fascism are dangerous, as fascists.”  Assuming that references to 
“fascist” imply a pro-Kremlin bias would completely misread user intent.  Consensus on how to 
sort signal from noise in the shadow of the irony confound has not yet emerged.  Analysis of 
large quantities of social media data usually depends on keyword string searches and machine-
learning algorithms.  These methods do not reliably identify irony, double-entendres, or sarcasm.  
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FIGURE SM-4
   
FIGURE SM3
CAPTION: As a validity check, we show the 100 most common words associated with 
pro-Kremlin (bottom) and anti-Kremlin (top) narrative, scaled by size to reflect 
prevalence in the overall hand-coded sample.
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 Before proceeding to analysis of the full data, therefore, we checked to see whether a 
different picture of social opinions among Russian-speaking Ukrainians would have emerged if 
we employed fluent Russian-speakers to try to parse tweets for user intent.  This second step 
found that 983 tweets – about one out of six – used the dictionary language ironically.  Common 
sources of miscoding requiring human correction arose from ironic usage, anti-Kremlin 
Ukrainians describing Putin as a fascist, expressions of outrage at police tactics at Maidan, and 
(rarely) sympathetic descriptions of the Pravyi Sektor movement.  Tables SM-1.3 and SM-1.4 
show the results of manual re-coding.  These manual codings are employed in all of the data 
visualizations in the paper that reference hand-coded data.   
 
TABLE SM-1.3: PRO-KREMLIN TWEETS AND IRONY 
 Irony  
No Yes 
Pro-Kremlin 
No 3255 588 3843 
Yes 1090 395 1485 
 4345 983 5,328 
 
TABLE SM-1.4: ANTI-KREMLIN TWEETS AND IRONY 
 Irony  
No Yes 
Anti-Kremlin 
No 722 339 1061 
Yes 3623 644 4267 
 4345 983 5,328 
 
Table SM
-1.5: Summary Statistics For All Hand-Coded Tweets  
  
Oblast 
Tweets Russian English Ukrainian 
Anti-
Kremlin 
Pro-
Kremlin Users Account 
Age 
M
edian 
Followers 
%
 
M
ale  
%
 
Bots 
Tweets per 
100k 
Not 
Novorossiya 
Transcarpathia 
19 
14 
1 
4 
14 
5 
15 
754 
266 
72.22 
0 
1.51 
L'viv 
149 
73 
1 
75 
119 
28 
80 
828 
202 
50.91 
5.71 
5.88 
Volyn 
15 
5 
0 
10 
13 
1 
14 
654 
156 
71.43 
0 
1.44 
Chernivtsi 
22 
10 
0 
12 
17 
2 
15 
605 
160.5 
9.52 
0 
2.42 
Ivano-
Frankivs'k 
28 
10 
3 
15 
21 
7 
22 
675 
74.5 
63.64 
0 
2.02 
Ternopil' 
34 
6 
2 
26 
33 
1 
15 
1343 
2667 
70.97 
0 
3.19 
Rivne 
36 
16 
1 
19 
30 
8 
12 
707.5 
62 
73.53 
0 
3.1 
Khmel'nyts'kyy 
28 
24 
0 
4 
19 
2 
17 
725 
42 
50 
35.71 
2.16 
Zhytomyr 
17 
10 
2 
5 
10 
5 
12 
374 
177 
33.33 
0 
1.36 
Vinnytsya 
52 
30 
4 
18 
31 
16 
29 
734 
72.5 
51.28 
0 
3.24 
Kirovohrad 
427 
411 
3 
13 
376 
80 
17 
1619 
1464 
23.53 
0.47 
43.81 
Cherkasy 
237 
208 
4 
25 
177 
87 
33 
697 
406 
87.5 
0.88 
19.02 
Kiev 
254 
199 
2 
53 
195 
60 
104 
409.5 
74.5 
62.05 
28.63 
14.67 
Kiev City 
838 
596 
89 
153 
580 
233 
406 
1019 
98 
51.65 
2.05 
28.89 
Chernihiv 
38 
31 
0 
7 
24 
9 
18 
942 
537.5 
50 
0 
3.63 
Sumy 
15 
12 
0 
3 
7 
6 
12 
895 
58 
41.67 
7.14 
1.35 
Poltava 
61 
53 
1 
7 
35 
24 
31 
864 
136 
52.63 
18.52 
4.23 
Odessa 
190 
168 
12 
10 
112 
82 
97 
854 
175 
65 
0 
7.96 
Novorossiya 
M
ykolayiv 
191 
181 
1 
9 
159 
37 
42 
1584 
1298 
39.06 
0.54 
16.47 
Kherson 
52 
45 
2 
5 
34 
20 
26 
909.5 
202.5 
45.24 
0 
4.89 
Dnipropetrovs'k 
384 
289 
36 
59 
238 
128 
181 
742 
116.5 
42.75 
11.64 
11.78 
Sevastopol' 
39 
39 
0 
0 
8 
26 
24 
1267 
189 
58.82 
0 
10.22 
Crimea 
151 
140 
5 
6 
56 
67 
70 
1140 
775 
61.82 
1.41 
7.69 
Kharkiv 
364 
305 
5 
54 
255 
122 
114 
920 
475.5 
50.6 
1.13 
13.38 
Zaporizhzhia 
142 
124 
4 
14 
78 
52 
67 
596.5 
97.5 
41.05 
17.97 
8.09 
Donets'k 
1212 
1178 
10 
24 
1006 
292 
157 
1602 
1374 
54.81 
0.6 
27.62 
Luhans'k 
333 
314 
11 
8 
292 
85 
27 
1615 
1451 
46.51 
0.6 
14.71 
NB: Percent M
ale and Percent Bots are for tweets, not accounts. Account Age is the median age, in days, of a Twitter account. 
 
Table SM
-1.6: Summary Statistics For All M
achine-Coded Tweets  
  
Oblast 
Tweets Russian English Ukrainian Anti-Kremlin Pro-Kremlin Users Account Age M
edian Followers Tweets per 100k 
Not Novorossiya Transcarpathia 
17359 
8281 
1662 
4447 
966 
126 
1281 
671 
88 
1378.25 
L'viv 
146749 64119 
8936 
61324 
11115 
836 
5427 
602 
232 
5787.83 
Volyn 
35921 
13375 
944 
18432 
2984 
133 
962 
519 
117 
3444.49 
Chernivtsi 
52493 
35336 
1695 
10842 
2109 
536 
1171 
486 
144 
5768.46 
Ivano-Frankivs'k 30068 
10317 
2502 
14108 
2724 
149 
1566 
550 
108 
2174.55 
Ternopil' 
18410 
6605 
1294 
8836 
1713 
94 
994 
745 
99 
1726.17 
Rivne 
50580 
23712 
1669 
21191 
3202 
336 
1298 
473 
97 
4352.66 
Khmel'nyts'kyy 40133 
22641 
1360 
13177 
2193 
412 
1439 
376 
109 
3096.44 
Zhytomyr 
31443 
21761 
1236 
6374 
1130 
400 
1582 
373 
53 
2517 
Vinnytsya 
109695 66663 
3599 
31330 
4565 
1198 
2509 
414 
73 
6837.69 
Kirovohrad 
69183 
44682 
11971 
4307 
2470 
851 
1858 
410 
115 
7097.7 
Cherkasy 
105786 70223 
3497 
24402 
4960 
1388 
2950 
554 
99 
8488.92 
Kiev 
473579 366492 19399 
51476 
16008 
7165 
14881 
638 
101 
27348.06 
Kiev City 
522716 376911 32293 
63578 
25090 
7356 
18989 
822 
86 
18018.97 
Chernihiv 
66051 
51396 
1853 
7282 
1722 
983 
1832 
485 
65 
6308.46 
Sumy 
28221 
23642 
989 
1129 
437 
499 
879 
389 
64 
2530.92 
Poltava 
67679 
51458 
2212 
8438 
2079 
1076 
2167 
535 
83 
4697.7 
Odessa 
356523 289294 17853 
11639 
9250 
5512 
8593 
592 
92 
14934.26 
Novorossiya 
M
ykolayiv 
89091 
76025 
1624 
5033 
4289 
1504 
2361 
497 
88 
7682.68 
Kherson 
90998 
77878 
2359 
3491 
2857 
1449 
2473 
489 
85 
8554.03 
Dnipropetrovs'k 644973 545817 16837 
31571 
18541 
10193 
10099 
572 
77 
19792.31 
Sevastopol' 
40863 
35063 
1139 
1303 
1629 
777 
2324 
908 
68 
10705.95 
Crimea 
181050 149008 
9052 
5271 
5453 
3018 
6755 
564 
116 
9219.51 
Kharkiv 
241548 190845 15555 
11962 
6285 
3694 
5916 
593 
85 
8879.32 
Zaporizhzhia 
172294 147333 
4436 
7122 
3384 
3212 
4676 
553 
77 
9813.61 
Donets'k 
266715 230295 
9887 
5251 
5599 
5084 
5439 
539 
73 
6078.69 
Luhans'k 
34127 
28204 
2154 
812 
2022 
708 
1250 
470 
63 
1507.59 
NB: Account Age is the median age, in days, of a Twitter account. Tweets column is all tweets, not just political ones. 
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2. Machine-Coding the Tweets & Curating The Sample 
 
 Building each model followed the same process.  First, we removed stopwords and 
tokenized the remaining ones in each tweet.  Second, we made a training set from 80% of the 
tweets.  Third, we made a term frequency-inverse document frequency matrix for the training 
and test tweets.   Fourth, we generated bagged estimators for each narrative: a support vector 
machine, Bernoulli Naïve Bayes, Gaussian Naïve Bayes, and a multinomial Naïve Bayes.  
“Bagged” means that for each classifier, we generated it on k random subsets of the training data, 
generating k predictions for each tweet; the predictions were averaged, ensuring that results were 
not driven by a specific part of the parameter space.  We varied the number of features 
(variables) each classifier could have; whether or not a variable could consist of 1, 2, or 3 words 
(it is an n-gram); and how many bags to use for each classifier.  For each combination of these 
parameters, we recorded the classifier’s precision, recall, accuracy, and F1 score.1  
To determine which classifier to use for which narrative, we chose a combination of 
parameters to maximize F1 or precision.2  For the pro-Russia tweets, we chose the classifier with 
the highest F1.  For the pro-Ukraine tweets, however, we chose the model with the highest 
precision, as models with high F1 scores tended to have too many false positives for our comfort.  
The pro-Russia classifier is Bernoulli Naïve Bayes with 45 bags, an n-gram of 1,800 features, 
																																																								
1 For an explanation of these steps and metrics, see Grimmer and Stewart (2013) and Lucas et al. 
(2015).   
2 Precision here means the percent of all tweets from the test set the classifier labels as “Pro-
Russian” or “Pro-Ukraine” that actually are.  Recall is the percent of all tweets in the test set that 
were manually labeled as “Pro-Russia” or “Pro-Ukraine” that the classifier correctly labels.  F1 
is the weighted combination of the two. 
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precision of .62, and an F1 score of .58.  The pro-Ukraine classifier is Gaussian Naïve Bayes 
with 10 bags, an n-gram of 1, 50 features, a precision of 1, and an F1 score of .56.   
One interesting and unexpected result of this process, completely unrelated to this paper’s 
theory, is that the language used for pro-Kremlin narrative appears to be simpler than the anti-
Kremlin language.  The pro-Kremlin classifier has more features (words) than the anti-Kremlin 
one (800 to 50) and the pro-Russia tweets constitute a greater percentage of the 204,189 
machine-coded tweets than they do of the dictionary-coded ones.  This increase is also notable 
because we initially seeded the dictionary with more pro-Kremlin words.  Not until training a 
classifier to recognize co-occurrences with dictionary words did we recover the volume of pro-
Russia tweets expected.  During the referee process we discovered another confound in the data: 
tweets originating from the Foursquare app.  Foursquare is a mobile app where users indicate 
they are in specific places and are connected with nearby app users.  If the user has not disabled 
certain settings, and has connected their Twitter account, when they check-in to a location tweets 
are sent.  Since no Foursquare tweets had appeared in the hand-coded data, this confound was 
not discovered until the referee process, but the Foursquare relaunch of its app during our study 
period seems to have unexpectedly yielded certain days with “tweet dumps.”  
We described our methods for assuring results were not drive by bots in the main text, 
but readers may also be curious to know how these robustness checks altered the sample.  We 
therefore reproduce Figure 4 from the main text in a few variants (recall that this is a 
visualization of the time trends of the two narratives in the larger dataset, for the subsample 
residing in historical Novorossiya, the site of an anticipated uprising). Figure SM-5, SM-6, and 
SM-7 replicate the form of this figure in order to demonstrate the negligible substantive effect of 
removing the Foursquare tweets or suspected bots or influencers from the data.   
 16 
Figure SM-5 
 
CAPTION:	 The	 subset	 of	 the	 raw	 data	 from	 the	 machine-learning	 dataset	 (N=204,189),	 replicating	 Figure	 4,	
using	only	data	generated	from	oblasts	in	historical	Novorossiya	on	the	full	sample.	Note	the	huge	spike	between	
June	13	and	July	11.		This	was	not	due	to	any	particular	offline	event:	only	due	to	a	surge	in	Foursquare	account	
activity.		This	was	our	first	clue	that	it	would	be	important	to	systematically	eliminate	these	accounts.		Luckily,	
the	fact	that	all	such	tweets	open	with	the	phrase	“I’m	at	[place]”	made	the	identification	and	elimination	of	this	
confound	 easy.	 	 The	N	 of	 our	 sample	 shrunk	 from	204,189	 to	 166,454	 as	 a	 result	 of	 dropping	 all	 Foursquare	
tweets.	
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Figure SM-6 
 
 
CAPTION:	 This	 figure	 reproduces	 Figure	 4	 except	 removing	 tweets	 from	 accounts	 that	 the	 Botometer	 service	
determines	are	 likely	 to	be	 from	bots.	 	The	Anti-Kremlin	narrative	more	strongly	dominates	once	 these	 tweets	
are	removed.	
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Figure SM-7 
 
This	figure	is	the	same	as	Figure	4,	except	with	tweets	removed	if	an	account	in	the	top	5	percent	of	the	tweet	
distribution	produced	them.		In	this	specification	the	pro-Kremlin	narrative	seems	to	have	a	slight	upper-hand	in	
Novorossiya	until	quite	late	in	the	conventional	warfare	phase,	though	the	two	narratives	track	together.	 	The	
analytic	take-away	(for	us)	 is	 that	results	can	depend	a	great	deal	on	filtering	assumptions	(and	anyway	does	
not	indict	the	core	conjecture	of	the	paper,	which	is	that	outside	of	Crimea	the	pro-Russia	narrative	did	not	have	
a	decisive	upper-hand	in	Russian-speaking	communities).	 	 	We	have	performed	the	same	analysis	on	all	tweets	
from	Ukraine	but	could	discern	no	meaningful	difference	from	Figure	SM-2,	so	we	do	not	show	that	figure.			
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3. Distribution of Tweets by Oblast 
To determine if tweets were well-distributed across users and oblasts, we normalized the number 
of accounts per oblast by population.  We normalized both the hand-coded accounts and the 
accounts identified using the topic model.  We also report the mean and median number of 
tweets per person.  Table SM-5.1 shows these results.  The correlation between the number of 
hand-coded accounts and the density of those accounts is .9069; for the topic model accounts, 
.827.  The distribution of the account densities, regardless of identification method, follows a 
log-normal distribution (histograms provided upon request).  The distribution of average number 
of tweets follows a normal distribution.  Note that each oblast has a much higher mean than 
median number of tweets per user, suggesting that there are some users who are simply more 
active than others.  This a common and well-documented feature of social networks.       
TABLE SM-5.1 
Oblast Pop. 
(Millions) 
Accounts 
(Hand) 
Density 
(Hand) 
Accounts 
(NLP) 
Density 
(NLP) 
Mean 
Tweets 
(NLP) 
Median 
Tweets 
(NLP) 
Cherkasy 1.25 33 26.48 867 695.73 7.34 2 
Chernihiv 1.05 18 17.19 494 471.81 5.48 2 
Chernivtsi 0.91 15 16.48 354 389.01 7.49 2.5 
Crimea 1.96 70 35.65 1729 880.45 4.93 2 
Dnipropetrovs'k 3.26 181 55.54 3568 1094.91 8.08 3 
 20 
Donets'k 4.39 157 35.78 1667 379.93 6.45 2 
Ivano-
Frankivs'k 
1.38 22 15.91 437 316.04 6.58 2 
Kharkiv 2.72 114 41.91 1630 599.19 6.15 2 
Kherson 1.06 26 24.44 675 634.52 6.39 2 
Khmel'nyts'kyy 1.3 17 13.12 407 314.02 6.4 2 
Kiev 1.73 104 60.06 4044 2335.31 5.75 2 
Kiev City 2.9 406 139.96 5281 1820.46 6.17 2 
Kirovohrad 0.97 17 17.44 457 468.85 7.28 2 
Luhans'k 2.26 27 11.93 421 185.98 6.54 2 
Lviv 2.54 80 31.55 1489 587.27 8.04 2 
Mykolayiv 1.16 42 36.22 618 532.93 9.39 2 
Odessa 2.39 97 40.63 2321 972.24 6.38 2 
Poltava 1.44 31 21.52 563 390.79 5.63 2 
Rivne 1.16 12 10.33 409 351.96 8.67 2 
Sevastopol' 0.38 24 62.88 557 1459.32 4.34 2 
Sumy 1.12 12 10.76 220 197.3 4.26 2 
 21 
Ternopil' 1.07 15 14.06 259 242.85 6.98 2 
Vinnytsya 1.6 29 18.08 801 499.29 7.22 2 
Volyn 1.04 14 13.42 337 323.15 9.26 2 
Zakarpattia 1.26 15 11.91 267 211.99 4.1 1 
Zaporizhzhia 1.76 67 38.16 1356 772.36 4.89 2 
Zhytomyr 1.25 12 9.61 406 325 3.77 2 
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4. Suggestive Mechanism Evidence: A War of Position (Co-Production of Narratives) 
 
Visual inspection of time trends in the hand-coded and machine-coded data suggests that 
both anti-Kremlin and pro-Kremlin narratives often peak on the same day.  Throughout our 
study, the inference we draw from this trend, reinforced by discussions with the coders, is that 
partisans on both sides were commenting on the same events in the media cycle, on the same 
day, reading and responding to each other’s commentary, mutually raising the political 
temperature.  We cannot test this directly because of the structure of our data, of course, but 
multivariate statistical models are a straightforward method see whether social media behaviors 
receptive to Russia’s narrative and behaviors that are oppositional correlated temporally and 
spatially.  This is an imperfect test of whether polarized Russian-speaking communities were 
“shouting” at each other on social media about the same online events.   
We model the production of narratives by country-day, oblast-day, and oblast-week using 
the coded tweets from the two classifiers.  Table SM-4.1 presents the results from five models. 
In all models, the outcome variable is the number of anti-Kremlin tweets.  All models include 
numerous temporal and socioeconomic controls.  Model 1 takes the country-day as the unit of 
analysis.  Models 2 and 3 aggregate to the oblast-week, and Models 4 and 5 employ the oblast-
day as the unit of analysis.  Since we have sufficient data to analyze oblast-days, Model 5 is our 
preferred model.  In all models, each discourse is contemporaneous with the other with very 
small p-values.  The only consistently significant socioeconomic variable is rural population, 
which positively correlates with the production of anti-Kremlin tweets.  The large sample size 
means that some other control variables are statistically significant in some models but not 
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others, but not in a way that lends itself to easy interpretation or theorization (which is anyway 
beyond the scope of our ambition).   
Also notable is that while anti-Kremlin behavior is contemporaneous with its pro-
Kremlin counterpart, previous pro-Kremlin content has no correlation with future anti-Kremlin 
content.  We view this as cautious evidence that users were competing in real-time.  Past anti-
Kremlin tweets positively correlate with future anti-Kremlin tweets in all model specifications. 
Table SM-4.2 revisits trends in the smaller, hand-coded dataset.  While reading carefully 
for false positives, we had our team code the production of ironic keyword use -- when a user 
employs words from one narrative’s keyword dictionary, but is clearly doing so in order to draw 
readers attention, then expose the absurdity of the entire line of argument.  In common-use 
parlance, the online behavior of interest is “trolling.” In these two models, the outcome is the 
ironic use of the anti-Kremlin discourse (e.g., using anti-Kremlin words in a way that is pro-
Kremlin).  Models are estimated using a negative binomial model.  These models show that 
ironic anti-Kremlin and non-ironic anti-Kremlin narratives tend to co-occur, regardless of 
whether the unit of analysis is oblast-day or oblast-week.3  Suffice to say that a variety of 
additional model specifications are possible (e.g., using only the hand-coded dataset, the hand-
coded dataset but treating bots differently, oblast fixed effects, etc.), but since there is no logical 
end-point to this sort of a-theoretical fishing expedition, rather than sprawl this Supplementary 
Materials needlessly, we invite future scholars to explore the replication data themselves.  
																																																								
3 We kept the bots in this analysis, since automated accounts are presumably also responding to 
offline events through unmolded processes. 
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TABLE SM-4.1: PRO-KREMLIN AND ANTI-KREMLIN NARRATIVES OCCUR IN 
THE SAME OBLASTS AT THE SAME TIME 
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TABLE SM-4.2: EARNEST PRO-KREMLIN & IRONIC “PRO-KREMLIN” TROLLING 
OCCURS IN THE SAME OBLASTS AT THE SAME TIME 
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DV: Count of Ironic Anti-Kremlin Tweets
Country-day Oblast-Week
(1) (2)
Pro-Kremlint .042** .031
(.021) (.029)
Anti-Kremlint .015*** .038***
(.003) (.005)
Pro-Kremlint-1 -.001 .021
(.022) (.028)
Anti-Kremlint-1 .003 -.025***
(.003) (.006)
Ironic Anti-Kremlint-1 .007 .208***
(.016) (.018)
Intercept .913
***
-.273
***
(.094) (.065)
Observations 185 501
Log Likelihood -422.059 -760.241
Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01
Negative binomial model
